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On-the-job Search in Italian Labour 








This paper analyses the determinants of on-the-job search activities of Italian workers. 
Using several waves of the Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) 
we estimate with a Probit model how individual socio-demographic characteristics and 
economic variables affect the probability of on-the-job search. We find that the probability 
of being engaged in job-search activities is higher for low-wage earners, for workers with 
low tenure and higher levels of education, for males and for residents in large cities. 
Moreover, we find significant differences in the determinants of on-the-job search activities 
across sectors. Public sector employees show a considerable lower probability of on-the-
job search compared to private sector workers; White-collars and teachers search much 
less than blue-collars (both in private and public sectors). Results suggest that the 
attractiveness of jobs varies considerably, even controlling for wage levels and that 
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Labour turnover typically imposes very large costs on firms and organizations in terms 
of loss of valuable human resources, disruption of ongoing activities, additional 
recruitment and training costs of new employees. On the other hand, labour turnover is 
the mechanism that labour markets use to correct job matching errors and might lead to 
a better and efficient allocation of human resources. Understanding the factors which 
determine worker’s initiated turnover, it is therefore an important economic topic, also 
relevant for decisions of firms and organizations.   
At the theoretical level, labour turnover has been analyzed by Becker (1962). 
His theory of human capital provides important elements for the analysis of 
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determinants of worker turnover. One   fundamental idea in the Beckerian framework is 
that an important part of skills that workers develop are learned on the job and are 
mainly useful in the current firm (firm-specific human capital). Hence, both firms and 
workers invest in workers’ skills in order to increase labour productivity and the longer 
an employee works for a given employer, the more specific capital he accumulates. For 
this reason, the lower the propensity of workers to move from the current firm is, the 
longer the job tenure is. 
Labour turnover and the costs for the firms related to it have been extensively 
analyzed by the efficiency wage literature which considers the wage that the firm pays 
as an important instrument to reduce labour turnover costs (Stiglitz, 1974; Salop, 1979). 
From the labour turnover model of efficiency wages it derives that firms with higher 
turnover costs tend to pay higher wages in order to discourages workers from turnover. 
The lack of suitable data on labour turnover does not allow to study this issue directly. 
However, information about “on-the-job search” decisions can be used as an indicator 
of voluntary job turnover to partly overcome these data limitations. The activity of 
searching for a job that takes place while the worker is still employed in his or her 
current occupation, may be considered as preliminary for job turnover or separations. In 
fact, in most cases successful job search is associated with workers decisions to quit 
their current work with the purpose of improving upon employment relationship. 
According to the extensive literature on this topic, turnover intentions (or on-the-job 
search decision) are supposed to be the immediate precursors to actual turnover and 
therefore these intentions are good at forecasting actual quits (van Ours, 1990; Burgess, 
1999; Sousa-Poza and Hennemberg, 2004; Kristensen and Westergård-Nielsen, 2004)
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. 
Accordingly, Kristensen and Westergård-Nielsen (2004) report that job search is a good 
predictor of actual quits.  
In models of on-the-job search, employed workers may shift from job to job 
without intervening spells of unemployment. More specifically, the on-the-job search is 
the outcome of an optimal choice of workers that engage in job search if the marginal 
return of searching (difference between the utility derived from the current job and the 
expected utility from the alternative job) exceeds its marginal cost. 
A strand of literature that uses direct measures of the job search process focuses 
on the determinants of employed search (Black, 1981, van Ophen, 1991). Other studies 
investigate the various job search methods (formal and informal search channels) and 
search intensity pursued by job seekers ( Kahn and Low, 1982, 1984; Parsons 1991, 
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Gregg and Wadsworth, 1996, Addison and Portugal, 2002). Other analysis deal with 
employees search intensity (Blau, 1992, Pissarides and Wadsworth, 1994, Fuentes, 
1998, Manning, 2003). 
 A growing evidence is focused on employees’ intentions to quit and other types 
of job separations. Some labour economics studies have investigated how individual 
characteristics and working conditions at the workplace measured, for example by 
industry injury rates or work attributes (harms, hazards, uncertainty, physically and 
mentally heavy work), affect job duration or employees probability to quit (Viscusi, 
1979; Bartel, 1982; van Ophem, 1991; Gronberg and Reed, 1994; Manning, 2003, 
García-Serrano 2004, Bockerman and Ilmakunnas, 2009). Empirical results show that 
adverse working conditions lead to an increase in quits. 
A number of studies have analyzed more in general the determinants of on-the-
job search propensity. A major line of research regarding the effect of wage level of the 
incidence of on-the-job search has been developed. Black (1981), using data from the 
United States, finds that one of the main determinants that encourage individual’s 
decision of whether or not to search for a new job is the potential wage gain he could 
obtain, estimated as the residual from a regression of the wage on human capital, 
demographic variables and local labour market conditions. Similarly, Hartog and van 
Ophem (1994) model the probability of US workers to search on-the-job as a function 
of a wage residual derived from a wage equation with years of education and labour 
market experience as explanatory variables. They find a significant negative effect of 
the wage residual on the job search decisions.  
Although the wage level has received a lot of attention in the literature, there are 
other reasons, such as individual and non-wage job characteristics, driving employees’ 
job search behavior. We focus on some determinants that we also include in our 
empirical analysis. Employee characteristics such as gender, age, marital status and 
education are important determinants of on-the-job search. It has been shown that the 
probability of being engaged in job-search decisions is higher for males (Blau and 
Kahn, 1981; Royalty, 1998), young workers (Campbell, 1997; Kidd, 1991, 1994), better 
educated and not married workers (Royalty, 1998; Holmlund, 1984). Many studies also 
show a positive effect of the status of temporary employment on-the-job search. 
Empirical analysis also predict that workers with short job tenure and high 
qualifications are more likely to search. For instance, Pissarides and Wadsworth (1994) 
find out that skilled workers search more than the unskilled do in Britain.  
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The economics literature also shows that workers’ decisions to engage in on-the-
job search are influenced by labour market conditions and institutional aspects such as 
employment protection legislation and/or Unions membership. In good markets with 
high growth rates and low regional unemployment rates, increasing the likelihood of 
finding good job offers, the probability of on-the-job search tends to rise. As regard to 
this evidence, some studies (Black, 1981; van Ours, 1990; Pissarides and Wadsworth, 
1994), for example, including variables capturing labour market conditions, find that 
local unemployment has a negative effect on the propensity to search especially for risk-
averse workers. Considerable evidence also show a negative correlation between union 
membership and voluntary turnover (Booth and Francesconi, 1999; Kidd, 1994; 
Lucifora, 1998). Furthermore higher levels of job security are associated with lower on-
the-job search activities (Burgess, 1994, 1999; Lazear, 1990). 
A growing empirical literature on job satisfaction underlines the relevance of job 
satisfaction as a determinant of worker turnover decisions; there exists a strong negative 
relationship with both quit intentions (Schields and Price, 2002; Sousa-Poza and 
Hennemberg, 2004; Kristensen and Westergård-Nielsen 2004; Delfgaauw 2007; 
Böckermann and Ilmakunnas, 2009) and actual quits (Freeman 1978; Akerlof 
et al.,1988; Clark and Georgillis, 1998; Clark et al., 1998; Clark, 2001; Lévy-Garboua, 
Montmarquette, and Simonnet 2007). In a cross-national analysis covering 25 countries, 
Sousa-Poza and Henneberger (2004) report strong negative relations between job 
satisfaction and turnover intention which reflect the probability that an individual will 
change his job within a certain time period, while Böckerman and Ilmakunnas (2009), 
using Finnish data, find the same link between job satisfaction and both intention to quit 
and job search.  
This paper analyses the determinants of on-the-job search activities of Italian 
workers. The aim of this study is to provide evidence about the impact of socio-
demographic characteristics and economic conditions on the probability of on-the-job 
search. To the best of our knowledge, there are no other studies investigating the 
determinants of on-the-job search activity with regards to Italy.  
The Italian labour market has several features making it worthwhile to analyze 
its effects on the job-search activities. In comparison to other advanced countries, Italy 
has a highly centralized wage bargaining system and typically local labour markets 
conditions and individual productivity have little influence on the determination of 
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wages. Furthermore, public sector employees enjoy better working conditions, strong 
job security and lower pressure to put effort on the job. 
It is therefore interesting to investigate how these factors affect on-the-job search 
behaviour of Italian workers.  
We use the latest six waves of the Survey on Household Income and Wealth 
(hereafter indicated as SHIW), conducted by the Bank of Italy from 1995 to 2006 in 
which personal and family information are combined with information on labour market 
behaviour of individuals. The Survey asks to workers and unemployed if they have 
carried out some actions to search for a new job opportunity in the past calendar year. 
We restrict the analysis to public and private employees and self-employed. We define 
the dependent variable as on-the-job search, which is set equal to one if individuals did 
some actions to look for a new occupation and we estimate a number of pooled Probit 
models for on-the-job search in order to verify empirically the relationship existing 




Our main findings are the following. In accordance with the existing literature 
we find that the wage level considerably decreases the probability to search for a new 
job, while a high educational level makes job search more likely. The probability of 
search is negatively related to worker’s accumulated tenure. Individuals living in large 
cities are more willing to change job. The number of jobs held and the average number 
of hours worked per week have a positive effect on the probability of searching for 
another job. Married women are less likely to be looking for an alternative employment 
and there is a very large effect of the presence of children on female job search. We find 
that public sector workers show a considerable lower probability of on-the-job search 
compared to private sector workers, suggesting the high attractiveness of Italian public 
jobs, beyond the anecdotal evidence of large queue in competition for public jobs. 
White-collars and teachers search much less than blue-Collars (both in private and 
public sectors). Results suggest that the attractiveness of jobs varies considerably, even 
controlling for wage levels and that notwithstanding the high degree of centralization 
Italian markets are reactive to job-search determinants.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a very simple 
theoretical model which sets out possible motivations for on-the-job search behaviour. 
Section 3 describes the SHIW dataset we use and gives some descriptive statistics. 
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Section 4 reports and discusses many different specifications explaining the probability 
of job search. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. A Very Simplified Model of On-the-Job Search 
 
The model presented in this section is inspired by the search model pioneered by 
Burdett (1978) who was the first to extend the classical search model by allowing 
workers to search for better jobs even after a job has been found. Variations and 
extensions of this model have been used to study the link between wages, labour 
turnover and the duration of employment spells (Eckstein and van den Berg, 2007, 
provide a review of the literature that uses the model as the basis for parameter 
estimation). We integrate the job-search model of Burdett (1978) with the theoretical 
considerations of Pencavel (1972), Anderson and Meyer (1994) and Clark (2001) on 
worker’s quit propensity. 
The main prediction of the search model is that employed workers who decide to 
search on the job are usually motivated by the desire to find a better job, typically a job 
with a higher growth. However, on-the-job search decision may be also affected by 
other relevant factors capturing information about job quality (e.g. the appeal of the 
individual to employers, the state of the aggregate labour market; the working hours; the 
typology of labour contract; the professional condition of worker; the perceived job 
security; the level of tenure accumulated). 
An individual will determine the intensity of his job search by equating marginal 
benefits and costs of the search. Define q as a composite index representing the “quality 
of the job” where q is a function of a number of factors: ( ),..,,, efwqq φ= : q is 
increasing in the wage w obtained in the current firm, but it is also increasing in the 
future career prospects, f; in the degree of job security, φ ; while it is decreasing in the 
level of effort required, e, (measured, for example, by hours of work) and so on. 
Following the existing literature, we assume that workers are able to observe job 
quality, q, of their current job as well as the quality of any job offer they might receive.  
Define ( )λec  to be the cost of an employed individual generating job offers at a 
rate λ . Let λ  denote the arrival rate of job offers for an employed worker that will 
choose λ  to maximize the value of being employed, ( )qV :  
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[1]   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )( ) ( )λδλ euu
q
M cVqVxdFcqVxVquqrV −−−−−+= ∫  
where r denotes the worker’s discount rate, ( )qu  is the instantaneous (net) utility 
obtained in the current job of quality q, ( )xV  is the value of an external job with 
quality x , ( )xF  is the distribution of quality of external jobs, Mc  is one-time cost of 
moving (which depends on individual characteristics), uδ  is the probability of becoming 
unemployed and uV  is the value of being unemployed. 
Equation [1] shows that the value of being employed increases with the quality 
of the current job and that a worker will accept a job offer whenever this new job is of 
higher quality than his/her current job, net of any mobility costs. 
Consider the choice of search intensity λ  by an employee which aims to 
maximize ( )qV . The first-order condition for this maximization problem can be written 
as: 
[2]     









The left-hand size of (1) represents the marginal cost of search. On the other 
hand, the right-hand size is the expected gain of an extra job offer.  
Under the standard assumption that ( )λec  is increasing and convex, that is, 
0>′ec  and 0<′′ec , equation [2] shows that the intensity of job search depends 
negatively on factors increasing the “quality” of the current job q: a higher current 
wage, a higher predicted wage growth, the degree of security of the job, other non-wage 
benefits and so on. Therefore workers experiencing a lower quality of their job provide 
a greater effort in search and, consequently, they will have a higher probability of 
finding a better occupation. 
On the other hand, good external perspectives, represented by the value of ( )xV  
will tend to increase the effort in on-the-job search: the value of worker’s skills for 
potential employers, the state of the labour market, the extent of a network of social 
relationships favouring the transmission of information on job opportunities and so on. 
Finally, equation [2] shows that the mobility costs in which a worker incurs if 
he/she changes job will reduce search intensity: for example, the necessity to move in 
another city could represent a  very high cost for married individuals or individuals with 
children. 
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In the following Sections, using data on Italian workers, we try to verify 
empirically some of the theoretical predictions of this model. 
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3. The Data 
 
This section briefly describes the data and the construction of the sample. The data 
source we use for our empirical analysis is the Survey of Household Income and Wealth 
(SHIW) which is conducted every two years by the Bank of Italy on a representative 
sample of about 8,000 Italian households.
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 The SHIW contains a rich set of information 
on demographic and social characteristics of all individuals within  the households, such 
as age, gender, marital status, education, region of residence as well as information on 
individuals’ working activity (earnings, employment status, type of occupation, 
industry, firm size, work experience and so on). We pool together SHIW data drawn 
from the six latest waves, conducted respectively in 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004 and 
2006. 
The Survey asks to workers and unemployed if they have started searching for a 
new occupation/position or if they have carried out some actions to look for a job 
opportunity during the reference year. We focus on employees and self-employed, 
neglecting the unemployed.  
Each employed individual was asked, with reference only to his or her current 
job, “Have you been looking for another job in this year?” We use the respondents’ 
answer to this question to define the dichotomous dependent variable On-the-job Search 
that takes the value of one if the respondent reports that he has searched for a new job, 
and zero otherwise. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the analysis. 
The mean value of On-the-job Search is 0.081 with a standard deviation of  0.27. 
Females make up 39% of the sample. Education represents the years of schooling.
 
It is 
set at 0 for no educational qualification; 5 for elementary school; 8 for middle school; 
11 for some high school; 13 for high school; 18 for university; 20 for a postgraduate 
qualification. The average number of years of education for workers in the sample is 11. 
66% of the sample are married people
4
. The average level of labour income (in log) is 
9.5. 
 
Table 1 around here 
  
21.6% of the sample are Public employees and 21.8% are self-employed. The 
experience of workers refers to the experience accumulated before the current job, 
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obtained by calculating the total years of experience accumulated by the employees 
minus the current job tenure. The average levels of experience and tenure are 5.3. and 
15 respectively. Residents in the North-West or North-East constitute 48%, 22% live in 
the Centre and 30% live in the South  or on the Islands.
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 People living in very small 
towns (below 20,000 inhabitants), make up 29% of the sample; 8.6% live in very large 
cities with more than 500,000 inhabitants. The average number of jobs performed is 
1.95. Among private employees individuals employed in small firms (with fewer than 
20 employees) make up 44%, 28% work in medium-sized firms (20-99 employees) 
while 28% work in large firms (100 or more employees). The average 9umber of job 
experiences (including the present job) by a worker and the total hours worked per week 
are 1.96 and 38 respectively. The average Regional Unemployment rate is 9.1 
percentage points.  
In Table 2 we investigate the on-the-job search distribution by individual 
characteristics.  
 
Table 2 around here 
 
Table 2 shows that males search more (8.5%) than females (7.8%). On-the-job search 
tends to increase with educational levels: workers with a College Degree or more show 
a 10.8 probability of search, while poorly educated individuals search significantly less. 
Public employees, search much less than other categories (3.6%), private workers 
(8.7%) and self-employed (5.9%). It is also interesting to note that employees with 
temporary contracts search much more (30%) than workers facing permanent jobs (7%). 
Workers with a level of tenure above the mean engage less on on-the-job search activity 
(6.2%) than those having a low level of tenure accumulated. Looking at the professional 
qualifications of private and public employees, it emerges that Blue-Collars show a 
11.4% probability of search, while that probability is equal to 7.1% for Teachers and 
Managers.  Moreover, workers in small firms (fewer than 20 employees) exhibit a 
higher probability to look for another job (13.2%) compared to those working in large 
firm (7.8%). According to the geographical areas, the probability of job search is lower 
in the Centre (7.5%) and in the South (7.9%) compared to the North-West regions 
(8.7%). A more rigorous analysis of the on the job search activity is carried out through 
the econometric estimations in the next section.  
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4. An Empirical Analysis of On-the-Job Search Activities in Italy 
 
In this Section in order to analyze the determinants of on-the-job search activities, we 
estimate a number of specifications of a probit regression on pooled data. The 
dependent variable is On-The-Job Search. We restrict our sample to public and private 
employees and self-employed, aged between 15 and 65 years.  
The estimated on-the-job search coefficients from Probit regressions are based 
on the following equation: 
(3)             ( ) )(|1Pr 3210 iii CBEZXSearch +++Φ== βββ  
where Search  is on-the-job search of individual i , iZ  is a vector of  individual and 
socio-demographic characteristics (gender, marital status, residence, etc.), iE  describes 
a number of economic variables (employment status, labour income, typology of job 
contracts, regional unemployment rate, work experience, job tenure), iC  includes firm 
characteristics, Φ  represents the standard normal cumulative distribution function. In 
order to estimate the coefficients of interest, we use a Maximum Likelihood Estimator, 
which, as shown by Wooldridge (2002), is consistent, asymptotically normal and 
efficient under very general assumptions. 
The reported coefficients in Tables 3 and 4 represent the marginal effects, 
evaluated at the mean values of the explanatory variables in the sample. In all the 
equations sample weights provided in the SHIW dataset are used. In all the regressions 
we control for dummy year variables (not reported). 
In order to analyse the potential differences in the determinants of on-the-job 
search activities of employed individuals, in column 1 of Table 3 we report the 
estimated coefficients for the whole sample of workers. Columns 2 and 3 replicate 
column 1’s analysis separately for men and women. 
 
Table 3 around here 
 
 
Results of column (1) show, in accordance with the existing literature, that the 
educational level has a positive impact on actual job search probably because a high 
level of education is often associated with better labour market alternatives. Better 
educated workers may be more efficient in searching and are faced with more job 
opportunities. Ceteris paribus, they may have access to better job positions, the 
attainment of an educational qualification is able to signal their skills to external 
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employers. In our analysis one more year of education increases the probability of 
search on the job of about 0.2 percentage points. In all specifications the education 
coefficient is highly statistically significant (p-value 0.000). 
As regards gender, females turn out to be significantly less prone to search for a 
new job (about 1% less). One possible reason of the different search behaviour between 
men and women could be related to the costs of search, including any opportunity costs. 
There is reason to suspect that the opportunity costs – including the cost of non-wage 
time that is used to search rather than for other non-work activities – and the mobility 
costs incurred by individuals may be higher for women than for men. 
Being married shows a negative significant effect on job search decision since it 
is much more costly for a worker to move with a family (Holmlund, 1984; 
Zimmermann, 1984). The coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level for the 
sample of all employees. 
In column (1) we consider, as determinant of on-the-job search activity the log 
of Labour Income. As we have seen in Section 2, a very clear prediction from turnover 
models is that the intensity of search is decreasing in the wage because the higher the 
wage level is, the less the potential gains from job search are, as there are fewer higher 
wage jobs to find. This factor has received a lot of attention in the literature: human 
capital theory predicts that, other things being equal, a worker will have a greater 
probability of quitting if his wage is low, simply because workers have more possibility 
to find a better-paid job by changing employers. Efficiency wages theories have shown 
the interest of firms to pay a higher wage in order to discourage worker turnover and 
avoid to bear the related turnover costs. Our analysis strongly confirms this prediction: 
estimations show an inverse relation between labour income and the probability of job 
search (the effect of labour income is highly significant (t-stat is 30.05)). Ceteris 
paribus, a wage increase of 1,000 euros (starting from the average level) leads to a 
reduction of 4.7% in the probability to search for a new job for the whole sample of 
employees. Results show that labour income strongly reduce on-the-job search, but also, 
that a convex relationship exists between on-the-job search behaviour and labour 
income: at high level of labour income, a further increase of income has a decreasing 
effect on the probability of on-the-job search.  To make clearer this aspect, we represent 
graphically in Figure 1 the relationship between the probability of on-the-job search and 
labour income.  
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Figure 1 around here 
 
 
We obtain very similar results if – instead of the log of income – we insert 
income in linear and squared terms. 
Most important for the purposes of the analysis, in column (1) we examine if 
there exist differences in job-search activities across type of occupations. The omitted 
category is private employee. Ceteris paribus, estimates show that being employed in 
the public sector reduces the probability of searching for a new job of about 
3.1%compared to private employees (the coefficient is significant at the 1 percent 
level). This remarkable difference – obtained controlling for wage levels – is probably 
due to a number of advantages enjoyed by public sector employees, such as a higher 
degree of protection against the risk of losing their own job, lower pressure by managers 
and supervisors to provide effort on the job, more relaxed work environment. This is an 
important result which proves the attractiveness of Italian public jobs (on this point, see 
also Scoppa, 2009), beyond the anecdotal evidence of large queue in competitions for 
public jobs.  
Our estimates show that being self-employed reduces on-the-job search of 1.3% 
compared to private employees. This results can be due to the fact that, holding other 
things constant, self-employed people enjoy their position as independent actor on the 
market. That condition of independence gives them a higher measure of self-
determination and freedom since they are not subject to a hierarchy and they do not 
have to obey orders given by their superiors, leading to a decrease in the probability of 
searching for an alternative job. 
Following the existing literature, in all specifications we include among the 
explanatory variables the levels of tenure and experience of workers and their squared 
terms.  
The experience of workers refers to the experience accumulated before the 
current job, obtained by calculating the total years of experience accumulated on the 
labour market minus the current job tenure. Given that we include also the variable 
Tenure, we use this measure of Experience to avoid problems of collinearity with 
Tenure. The coefficient of Experience turns out to be not statistically significant 
different from zero. 
Tenure is defined as the difference between the worker’s age and the age in 
which he/she has started to work in the current firm. Results show that Tenure is 
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negative and highly significant in all specifications. The longer is the tenure, the higher 
is the accumulation of firm specific human capital and, therefore, the higher is the 
productivity in the current firm. However, this reflects in a higher wage. Holding the 
wage constant, the additional negative effect of the tenure on the probability of on-the-
job search may probably reflect good relations with colleagues, the development of trust 
and social cohesion, promotion opportunities at the workplace and so on. Furthermore, a 
high level of tenure implies that the current match between the worker and the employer 
is the best one available in the labour market.  
Tenure Squared turns out to be positive, implying that the marginal effects of 
tenure are decreasing. Accordingly to our estimations, the relationship between search 
on the job and tenure is therefore convex, similar to the relationship with labour income.  
In our regressions we also consider the 9umber of Job Experiences previously 
held by the worker as a factor that may affect the probability of on-the-job search. The 
results of the estimates show that one more job experience in the past increases the 
probability of being engaged in job search activities by 0.6% for the whole sample of 
employees (statistically significant at the 1 percent level). This is probably due to a 
larger network of acquaintances acquired on previous jobs which may help to find a 
new job or to a greater individual propensity to move from one job to another. 
In column (1) we include as explanatory variable the Fixed Term Contract status 
to verify the effects of a non permanent position of the worker on the probability to 
search for a new job. As expected, results show an increase of 9.2 percentage points in 
the probability of engaging of on-the-job-search activity in the case of temporary labour 
contracts. The strong statistical significance and the magnitude of the coefficient imply 
that temporary jobs are much less desirable than permanent ones. Furthermore, the 
approaching of the end of the contract could be the most important reason for inducing 
workers to engage in on-the-job search activity since they may have a high expectation 
of leaving their current firm. Finally, workers holding a temporary contract may be less 
integrated in the firm or may suffer worse working conditions than workers holding a 
permanent contract (Garcia-Serrano, 2004).  
In all specifications we control for geographical dummy variables to capture 
both the effects of different regional labour market conditions and the average quality of 
jobs. Moreover, we also consider the unemployment rate at regional level. Regional 
unemployment rates are taken by Labor Force Survey conducted by ISTAT (the 
National Statistic Institute). It is plausible to think that the propensity to search for 
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another job depends on the state of the regional labour market. According to the existing 
literature, workers search less in regional labour markets with high unemployment rate. 
In fact workers will have a higher probability of search for a different job when it is 
relatively easy for them to obtain a better job quickly. Thus, when jobs are more 
plentiful relative to job seekers, one would expect the search rate to be higher than when 
few jobs are available and many workers are being laid off.  
Italy is characterized  by huge regional differences, favouring the North-East and 
North-West regions, in terms of employment perspectives, quality of jobs and 
unemployment rates.  
The existence of these discrepancies among the country are partly confirmed in 
our findings. according to the geographical areas, results in column (1) show that, the 
probability of search on-the-job is lower in the Centre and in the South by 1 and 1.8 
percentage points respectively than the North-Western regions, the reference category.  
In contrast to theoretical predictions, in our specification the Unemployment 
coefficient is not significant. This result can probably be explained by the fact that 
regions with high levels of unemployment also tend to provide worse jobs, that is, less 
stable and with worse working conditions (unobservable characteristics in the data) and 
therefore there is the tendency for employees to search for better jobs in these markets, 
offsetting the effects of  looking at job opportunities. 
Note that since the unemployment rate is defined at a regional level, the standard 
errors reported in Tables 3 and 4 are corrected for the potential clustering of the residual 
at the regional level.  
In regression (1) we also control for the city size dummies. Results show that job 
search activity appears to increase with the size of the town where individuals live: 
workers search 2 percentage points more in very large cities compared to the reference 
category (towns with fewer than 20,000 inhabitants). This finding is probably due to the 
fact that large cities are characterized by thicker labour markets, in which search 
activities are more productive in terms of probability of job matching.  
In order to check the relative importance of determinant factors on search 
activities among men and women, columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 replicate column 1’s. The 
estimated coefficients of on-the-job search explanatory variables are quite similar: the 
results show that men and women do not exhibit significant differences in their on-the-
job search behaviour. The only relevant differences concern the following aspects: other 
things being equal, married women are more strongly discouraged to search for another 
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job (-2.6%) compared to married men (-1.0%)  (but in both cases the married dummy is 
significant at the 1% level). At the same time, having children does not seem to affect 
job search propensity of men while there is a large negative effect from the presence of 
children for females (the effect is significant on the 1% level): having a child reduces 
the probability to look for an alternative employment by 2.1%.  
In order to evaluate potential differences in the determinants of on-the-job search 
decisions between public and private employees, in Table 4, columns 1 and 2, 
respectively, we separately report the estimated coefficients for the two categories of 
workers.  This potential divergence in on-the-job search activity between public and 
private employees might arise for many reasons governing employment relationship. 
 Italian public employees enjoy many favourable working conditions such as a 
very high degree of job security (public employees are assured of employment until 
retirement), lower pressure by managers and supervisors to provide effort on the job 
(“low powered incentives” since it is particularly difficult to measure both individual 
and aggregated performance), more relaxed work environment and better social climate. 
These aspects make public sector employment particularly attractive for workers, 
explaining individuals’ willingness to queue to get public jobs, although the wage 
premium is not very high. The negative coefficient attracted by Public employees in 
Table 3 partly confirms these aspects. 
Table 4 around here 
 
Results in Table 4 show that the probability of looking for another job is negatively 
related to the Wage for both public and private employees but the effect is much 
stronger in the private sector. Ceteris paribus, an increase in the Labour Income leads to 
a reduction of about 7% for private workers and only 2.5% for public employees. This 
might suggest that public employees are interested in other non-wage aspect of their job 
(job security, work pace, and so on). Similarly, the educational level has a positive 
impact on on-the-job search for both private and public employees but the coefficient 
shows a bigger magnitude with respect to private workers: one more year of education 
increases the probability of search of a new job by 0.4 percentage points. Looking at the 
experience level of workers, it significantly increases the probability of on-the-job 
search for the sub sample of private employees (0.2%) whereas the coefficient turns out 
to be not statistically different from zero for public employees. Moreover, results show 
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that the Number of Job Experiences and the effect of a Fixed term contract even if 
significant for both categories, are more important for private employees.  
In the specifications reported in Table 4 we control for some additional variables that 
are only available for the categories of private and public employees. In particular, we 
introduce the average 9umber of Hours Worked (per week). Results show that the 
number of work hours has a positive impact on the probability of search for another job 
for the sub-sample of private employees (while has no effect on public employees). One 
more hour worked increases the probability of on-the-job search of 0.1% (the 
coefficient is significant at 1% level). It is worthwhile to note that in the regression we 
are taking the wage constant, so a higher number of working hours implies a lower 
hourly wage: this explains why employees tend to search more. 
Only for private employees (column 2) we also consider firm size dummies: 
Medium Firm (20-99 employees) and Large Firm (100 or more employees).
6
 Our 
results show that the size of the firm in which employees work does not have a 
significant impact on the probability of job search. This result is likely due to the fact 
that we are controlling for workers’ labour income. Even if large firms tend to have 
substantial firm-specific and screening investments in their workers, they pay higher 
wages to discourage worker turnover.  In fact, if we do not control for individual labour 
income, we obtain the traditional effect showing a drastic decrease in the job search as  
the firm size increases. 
In columns 1 and 2 we also control for the professional qualifications of private 
and public employees. It emerges that White Collars and Teachers (both in private and 
public sector) search significantly less compared to the Blue Collars (the reference 
category). 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
This study has explored on-the-job search activities of workers in Italian labour 
markets. Due to a lack of available data, allowing to match workers’ and employers’ 
characteristics with decisions of voluntary turnover, we have used on-the-job search 
intensity as a proxy of workers voluntary turnover. To the best of our knowledge, there 
are no other studies investigating the determinants of on-the-job search activity with 
regards to Italy.  
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We argued that the Italian labour market has several features such as a highly 
centralized wage bargaining system, wages not reactive to labour market conditions and 
public sector employment which seems particularly attractive. 
On the basis of these aspects, by investigating empirically the differences in the 
determinants of on-the-job search activities between public and private employees, we 
have shown that the public sector employees have a considerable lower probability of 
on-the-job search, compared to private sector workers, even controlling for wage levels. 
This indirectly result suggests  the high attractiveness of Italian public jobs.  
In accordance with the findings in other countries, we have found that the 
probability of being engaged in job-search activities is much lower when the wage is 
higher. It is higher for males, for workers with low tenure and higher levels of 
education, for workers with thick networks of informal relationships build in previous 
work experiences and for residents in large cities. Married women are less likely to be 
looking for an alternative employment and there is a very large negative effect from the 
presence of children on female job search.  
Notwithstanding the high centralization of wage bargaining our findings show 
that Italian workers are highly mobile and reactive to labour market conditions and 
individual characteristics. Moreover, the evidence we gathered suggests that jobs do not 
differ only in terms of the wage paid, but there are a number of characteristics that 
workers consider in their choice of job. 
As this study is based on household survey data, it was possible to include firm 
characteristics only by introducing firm size and professional qualifications as controls 
variables. Further research into this topic should link employer-employee data providing 
much more detailed firm-individual level information not available in this phase on the 
analysis. In addition, it would be interesting to verify whether workers searching in a 
certain period for a job effectively quit in the subsequent periods, but this kind of study 
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     Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variables        Mean St. Dev. Min Max Obs. 
On-the-Job Search 0.081 0.273 0 1 44721 
Female 0.387 0.487 0 1 44721 
Education (in years) 10.952 3.876 0 20 44721 
Married 0.657 0.475 0 1 44721 
9umber of Children 0.457 0.733 0 5 44721 
Labour Income (in log) 9.520 0.621 .081 13.852 41207 
Public Employee 0.216 0.411 0 1 44721 
Self Employed 0.218 0.413 0 1 44721 
Experience (in years) 5.335 8.439 0 51 44210 
Experience squared 99.67 234.003 0 2601 44210 
Tenure (in years) 15.177 11.392 0 57 44263 
Tenure squared 360.107 439.965 0 3249 44263 
9orth-West 0.252 0.434 0 1 44263 
9orth-East 0.232 0.422 0 1 44721 
Centre 0.217 0.412 0 1 44721 
South 0.201 0.400 0 1 44721 
Islands 0.098 0.298 0 1 44721 
Very Small City (<20 inhabitants) 0.285 .452 0 1 44721 
Small City (20-40) 0.204 0.403 0 1 44721 
Medium City (40-500) 0.424 0.494 0 1 44721 
Large City (>500) 0.086 0.281 0 1 44721 
Small Firm (<20 employees) 0.441 0.496 0 1 25335 
Medium Firm (20-99) 0.277 0.447 0 1 25335 
Large Firm (>100) 0.278 0.448 0 1 25335 
White-Collar 0.283 0.450 0 1 44721 
Teacher 0.068 0.251 0 1 44721 
Junior Manager 0.048 0.215 0 1 44721 
Manager 0.019 0.138 0 1 44721 
Fixed Term Contract 0.055 0.228 0 1 44721 
9umber of Jobs Experiences 1.959 1.679 0 82 44685 
Hours worked per week 37.817 8.888 0 150 35084 
Regional Unemployment Rate 9.211 5.934 3.342 22.533 44721 





Table 2. On-the-job search distribution by 
individual characteristics.  
Variables Mean St. Dev. 
Female 0.078 0.269 
Male 0.085 0.278 
   
Elementary school 0.065 0.246 
Middle school 0.083 0.276 
High school 0.081 0.273 
College degree 0.105 0.307 
Postgraduate qualification 0.108 0.312 
   
Public Employee 0.036 0.186 
Private employee 0.087 0.282 
Self Employed 0.059 0.235 
Permanent Contract 0.068 0.252 
Fixed Term Contract 0.301 0.459 
   
Tenure below the mean  0.080 0.271 
Tenure above the mean  0.062 0.242 
   
Blue-Collar 0.114 0.317 
White-Collar 0.071 0.256 
Teacher 0.038 0.191 
Junior Manager 0.071 0.258 
Manager 0.038 0.191 
   
Small Firm (<20 employees) 0.132 0.339 
Medium Firm (20-99) 0.097 0.296 
Large Firm (>100) 0.078 0.268 
   
9orth-West 0.087 0.271 
9orth-East 0.081 0.274 
Centre 0.075 0.263 
South 0.079 0.269 
Islands 0.098 0.297 
Data source: SHIW 1995-2006.  





Table 3. Determinants of On-the-Job Search. Probit estimations. 
Dependent Variable: On-theJob Search. 
Variables Whole Sample Men Women 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Female -0.008**   
 (0.004)   
Education 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Married -0.006** -0.010*** -0.026*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) 
9umber of Children 0.000 0.000 -0.021*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
(Female)*(9umber of Children) -0.009***   
 (0.003)   
Labour Income (in log) -0.047*** -0.048*** -0.047*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Public Employee -0.031*** -0.034*** -0.024*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Self Employed -0.013*** -0.016*** -0.006 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Experience(years) 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Experience Squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tenure (years) -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.007*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tenure Squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
9umber of Jobs Experiences 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Fixed Term Contract 0.092*** 0.110*** 0.072*** 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.012) 
9orth-East -0.005 -0.003 -0.008 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Centre -0.010* -0.011* -0.009 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
South -0.018** -0.022** -0.014 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) 
Islands -0.015 -0.022 -0.003 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.014) 
Small City (20-40) 0.011** 0.011* 0.009** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) 
Medium City (40-500) 0.012** 0.012* 0.010** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) 
Large City (>500) 0.020** 0.025* 0.011** 
 (0.009) (0.014) (0.005) 
Regional Unemployment Rate 0.001 0.002 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
    
Observations 40672 24839 15833 
Pseudo R-squared 0.228 0.216 0.258 
Log-likelihood -9020 -5448 -3503 
Notes: Pooled Probit estimates. The dependent variable is On-the-Job Search. The coefficients 
represent the marginal effects. Standard errors (robust to heteroskedasticity) are reported in 
parentheses. The standard errors are corrected for the potential clustering of the residual at the 
regional level. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, 
respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. Sample weights are used. Year dummy variables 
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Table 4. Determinants of On-the-Job Search. Probit 
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Female -0.008** -0.006 
 (0.004) (0.005) 
Education 0.001*** 0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
Married -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
9umber of Children -0.001 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
(Female)*(9umber of Children) 0.004 -0.013** 
 (0.004) (0.005) 
Labour Income (in log) -0.025*** -0.068*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Experience (years) -0.000 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
Experience Squared -0.000 -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Tenure (years) -0.003*** -0.010*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Tenure Squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
9umber of Job Experiences 0.002*** 0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Fixed Term Contract 0.043*** 0.116*** 
 (0.012) (0.010) 
9orth-East -0.005* -0.005 
 (0.003) (0.005) 
Centre -0.006** -0.013*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
South -0.004 -0.028*** 
 (0.005) (0.007) 
Islands -0.002 -0.025*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) 
Small City (20-40) -0.002 0.017*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) 
Medium City (40-500) 0.002 0.015*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
Large City (>500) -0.002 0.026*** 
 (0.004) (0.008) 
Regional Unemployment Rate -0.000 0.002 
 (0.000) (0.006) 
Hours worked per week -0.000 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Medium Firm  -0.001 
  (0.004) 
Large Firm  0.002 
  (0.004) 
White-Collar -0.009*** -0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
Teacher -0.008** -0.039*** 
 (0.004) (0.010) 
Junior manager -0.008** 0.025** 
 (0.004) (0.010) 
 27
Manager 0.014 0.007 
 (0.012) (0.018) 
Observations 9393 24537 
Pseudo R-squared 0.264 0.194 
Log-likelihood -1074 -6695 
Notes: Pooled Probit estimates. The dependent variable is On-the-Job 
Search. The coefficients represent the marginal effects. Standard errors 
(robust to heteroskedasticity) are reported in parentheses. The standard 
errors are corrected for the potential clustering of the residual at the 
regional level. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are 
statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
Sample weights are used. Year dummy variables are included in all the 





                                                 
1
 The relationship between job search, job offers and mobility is analyzed in Hartog et al. (1988), Hartog 
and Van Ophem (1996) for Dutch employees during the eighties.  
2
 Unfortunately, the dataset we use does not allow us to describe the supposed correlation or the cause-
and-effect existing between on-the-job search and actual turnover. We do not have a panel data to verify 
whether workers searching in a period for a job effectively quit in the subsequent periods. 
3
 SHIW data are freely available at www.bancaditalia.it.  
4
 We set Married equal to zero if the individual has never got married, is widowed, separated or divorced. 
5
 North-West includes the following regions: Piedmont, Valle d’Aosta, Lombardy, Liguria; North-East 
includes Veneto, Trentino Alto Adige, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Emilia Romagna; Centre includes Tuscany, 
Lazio, Marche, Umbria; South includes Abruzzi, Campania, Apulia, Molise, Basilicata, Calabria; Islands 
include Sicily and Sardinia. 
6
 We have six categories for firm size and we tried to use all of them but the results are very similar. 
